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I. Mr. Keserovic Was Fully Advised. 
Keserovic argues that his attorney's inadequate advice concerning the potential for 
deportation entitles him to withdraw his guilty plea. But because both the prosecutor and judge 
informed him of possible immigration consequences, his attempt fails. 
II. The Magistrate Correctly Concluded that Ineffectiveness, if any, Was Cured. 
Central to the State's analysis in the Appellant's Brief are the recent Idaho Appellate 
cases Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014) and Grant v. State, Idaho_, 
329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App. 2014). These cases, together, indicate that ineffective assistance of 
counsel, in the form of inadequate information prior to a guilty plea, can be cured when the 
criminal defendant is fully advised by the Court. The respondent does not address these cases, or 
in any way attempt to distinguish them from the case at bar, which can be seen as a concession 
that they are controlling. 
The respondent continues to assert that Padilla decided that ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be cured. (Respondent' Brief, p. 10.) Padilla does not stand for that proposition 
and in fact there is no fair reading of the case that results in this understanding. See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). Further, both Murray and Grant hold generally 
that a Judge can cure ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit cases US. v. Lozano, 
540 Fed. Appx. 793 (9th Cir 2013) and US. v. Valedon, 496 Fed. Appx. 744 (9th Cir 2012) are 
even more specific, holding that the Court and State may cure inadequate defense counsel advice 
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regarding deportation issues, and both were decided after Padilla. 1 The evolution of Federal and 
State law (above) in the five years after Padilla establishes that information provided by the 
prosecutor or the court (or in Keserovic's instance, both) before the plea cures ineffective advice 
from counsel. 
Here, the State and Court clearly advised Mr. Keserovic of the consequences of his plea 
on the open record. Thus, the Magistrate's ruling that the State and Court cured any ineffective 
assistance of counsel should have been upheld and the District Court's decision overturning the 
Magistrate's ruling should be reversed. 
III. The District Court Erred in Overturning the Magistrate's Dismissal of the UPCPA 
Where There Was No Genuine Issue of Material Fact. 
No genuine issue of material fact exists that if decided in the Respondent's favor merits 
relief, so dismissal of his petition was proper. To merit relief on an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a post-conviction petitioner must show facts which support a finding that there 
was ineffective assistance of counsel and that the petitioner was prejudiced thereby. Keserovic 
was not prejudiced or impacted in a negative way by counsel's advice for two reasons. First, he 
benefitted from a favorable plea offer, and rejecting the offer would not have been rational, even 
given different information from his attorney. Second, he was given accurate and sufficient 
information by the prosecution and by the Court. Thus, any ineffectiveness, even if presumed 
1 Rather than address the 2012 Valedon case and the 2013 Lozano case, both of which were cited 
in the State's Corrected Appellant's Brief, the Respondent relies on Ohio and Texas State Court 
cases, which are neither more applicable nor more persuasive. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16.) 
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for the purposes of the proceedings, was cured. Mr. Keserovic cannot claim ignorance of facts 
of which he was made aware. 
Because no determination of facts could show Mr. Keserovic was prejudiced, the District 
Court erred overturning the Magistrate's decision. 
A. Rejecting Rule 11 Not Rational 
Padilla says that, "to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the 
court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances." Id. at 372. Mr. Keserovic was facing either (1) a guilty plea to a misdemeanor, 
accompanied by deportation or (2) a trial on a felony, with overwhelming evidence which would 
likely have resulted in conviction, also accompanied by deportation. Thus, Keserovic could not 
meet the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, prejudice 
standard because it would not have been rational to reject the misdemeanor plea deal where 
conviction on the felony was likely and would still have been followed by deportation. Because 
rejecting the plea agreement would not have avoided deportation for Mr. Keserovic and, instead, 
most likely would have resulted in a felony conviction and deportation, choosing the latter would 
not have been rational. While Mr. Keserovic makes bald assertions that he would have behaved 
differently with different information from his attorney, he was fully informed by the Court and 
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State and it still would not have been objectively reasonable to reject the offer.2 There is no 
genuine issue of material fact in this regard. 
Mr. Keserovic now claims that had he been fully informed by his counsel, he would have 
behaved differently. The Murray and Grant cases are informative because they demonstrate that 
a UPCPA petitioner later declaring some fact to be true is insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Mr. Keserovic's claims are belied by his acts and by the court record; therefore he 
is unable to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, and again, the Magistrate's dismissal 
was proper. 
The Respondent argues that the State improperly requests that this Court consider the 
contents of the store's video surveillance recording, which is not part of the appellate record. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 21.) The State did not. The State, instead, cited to transcripts in the 
record which discuss the evidence against the Respondent, including the video. The State's 
reference to the contents of the record is proper. The existence of the video, and Mr. Keserovic's 
awareness of the contents, goes to the rationality of entering a not guilty plea. (R p. 44, L. 14-
20, p. 45, L.2-3) When his own counsel states (referring to the video) that the person stealing the 
bag looks "exactly" like the defendant, pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, despite the 
immigration consequences, was "rational." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. at 372. A decision to 
2 Further, Mr. Keserovic actually received notice that his plea "subjects him to deportation" and 
still entered a guilty plea. Thus his own actions reveal that a rational person in his position 
would have still entered a guilty plea. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 4 
g:\jkd\keseroviclbrief\appellant's reply brief.doc 
reject the favorable plea agreement, in light of such evidence, would not have been rational. Id. 
Again, there is no prejudice. 
B. Claim of Better Negotiated Resolution Has No Basis 
The Respondent claims that, "it is probable that Mr. Keserovic could have negotiated a 
deal in which he pled to the same offense but to a 364-day sentence, rather than a 365-day 
sentence." This bald assertion has no basis in the record.3 No fact suggests that a more lenient 
offer would have been available had the post-conviction petitioner simply waited to enter a plea. 
As stated earlier, the legal test is whether rejecting the plea deal and proceeding to trial would 
have been rational. And here it would not. (See above argument, section III. A) Further, Mr. 
Keserovic cites to nothing in the record to support his premise that the State would have offered 
a reduced negotiated sentence. The magistrate was correct not to accept such assertions. See 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Because this argument has no evidentiary basis, the District Court's decision overturning 
the Magistrate's decision in this matter should be reversed. Without some basis in the record, Mr. 
Keserovic' s groundless suppositions do not rise to the level of a genuine issue of material fact. 
This argument is merely a distraction. 
3 Because this was a strong prosecution case, it was settled via a Rule 1 l(f) plea and sentencing 
agreement which allowed Mr. Keserovic to plead guilty to a reduced charge, thereby avoiding 
exposure to a potential prison sentence. (R p. 40, L. 17-25). Because the sentence was 
stipulated, there was no reason for the State to argue aggravating factors to the sentencing court. 
The Record before this Court is therefore devoid of all of the bases (although irrelevant to this 
appeal) that contributed to the manner in which this case was resolved below. 
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C. Any Ineffectiveness Was Cured, Therefore No Genuine Issue 
Mr. Keserovic claims that the notice provided by the Court and prosecution was 
inadequate. However, even Mr. Keserovic has previously granted that the notice was reasonably 
accurate. (Verified Petition, R p. 23.) In addition, a plain reading of the transcript reveals that 
not only did the State give Mr. Keserovic clear notice, the Court made numerous meaningful 
inquiries into the issue. During the plea hearing Mr. Keserovic was told on the record that: 
"We just need to make it very clear on the record the State understands a petit 
theft with 365 days as being what the ICE or the federal government determines 
to be an aggravated felony even though it is a misdemeanor. It is the State's 
understanding that this does subject Mr. Keserovic to deportation and so in 
entering this plea of guilty, we just want it very clear on the record that he 
recognizes that it does subject him to that potential." 
(Tr p. 4, L.12-20.) The Court then inquired of Mr. Keserovic's attorney about whether he had 
conferred with his client on this subject, and Mr. McKinnie responded, "On multiple occasions, 
Judge. We've talked about the fact that this could raise immigration issues with regard to 
entering a plea in this case." (Tr p. 4, L. 23-25.) The Court then inquired of Mr. Keserovic 
directly about whether he was aware that, "by entering a plea of guilty to this charge this 
morning that it could affect your citizenship, your application for citizenship or your ability to 
work in the United States?" (Tr p. 5, L. 1-4.) Mr. Keserovic answered in the affirmative. The 
State was then asked for additional comment. The State, again, emphasized Mr. Keserovic's 
immigration consequences, "I believe it has been discussed that it subjects him to deportation 
and so I don't have anything else to add after that." (Tr p. 10, L. 6-8.) 
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Mr. Keserovic claims this notice was insufficient because the prosecutor said "may" - but 
that word was not uttered by the State. (Respondent's Brief, p. 19 and R p. 64, L.11-20.) 
Further, Valedon and Lozano demonstrate that words evidencing a conditional possibility, such 
as "could" or "possible" do not undermine a meaningful notice. 4 In this case, the State provided 
notice on two occasions during the hearing, at one point stating that the plea subjected Mr. 
Keserovic to deportation, in addition to the Court's admonitions. The notice to Mr. Keserovic by 
the State and the Court was very clear. 
Mr. Keserovic claims the defense attorney is the only person in a courtroom who can 
inform and interact with a defendant. He posits: 
and 
"Padilla makes it evident that the non-citizen defendant's right to be informed of 
clear immigration consequences derives from the Sixth Amendment's right to 
counsel, and so it is irrelevant that the court or the prosecutor may have alerted 
Mr. Keserovic to the consequences of a guilty plea." Brief of Petitioner-
Respondent at 15. 
"Further, prejudice from the inaccurate and misleading advice of counsel cannot 
be cured by the State or Court as the obligation to provide accurate advice 
regarding immigration consequences falls on defense counsel. Padilla at 1486." 
Brief of Petitioner-Respondent at 10. (Emphasis added). 
But this is not what the United States Supreme Court actually said in Padilla. If it was, 
there would be no basis for this appeal, because the Supreme Court would already have decided 
4 "[T]he district courts' advice that there "could" be immigration consequences to his conviction, 
not that such consequences were mandatory did not violate due process or Rule 11 or render his 
plea involuntary or unknowing." Valedon, 496 Fed Appx. 744 at 747. In Lozano, the Ninth 
Circuit refused to overturn his guilty plea, because the Court informed him of "[T]he possible 
immigration consequences by the plea agreement .... " (Emphasis added.) 540 Fed. Appx. 793 at 
794. 
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the very issue before this Court. Padilla does not hold that information, inquiries or admonitions 
by prosecutors, plea forms or the court are insufficient to provide necessary information to a 
defendant. Keserovic' s self-serving expansion of the holding in Pad ill a is not only unsupported 
by Padilla itself, it is contrary to the latest interpretations by the Ninth Circuit on this issue and 
by the Idaho appellate courts on related issues, which may provide insight into why Keserovic 
declined to address either of the latest appellate opinions in his brief. 
In 2010 Padilla changed the expectations of counsel in regard to immigration advice in 
criminal cases, and cases decided afterward continue to define the contours of that decision. As 
this area of law has evolved, it does not support the position Keserovic asserts. Modern analysis 
of this issue requires application of post-Padilla federal analysis, as evidenced by Valedon and 
Lozano, and similar ineffective counsel notification issues such as those found in the 2014 Idaho 
Murray and Grant decisions. Keserovic's decision to ignore the most recent law5 prevents him 
from putting the issue into proper context or giving it proper legal treatment. 
IV. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Magistrate was correct in dismissing the UPCP A petition. Mr. 
Keserovic did not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice. Mr. Keserovic 
could not meet the applicable standards, discussed in Padilla itself, because rejecting the Rule 11 
plea agreement would not have been rational. Further, the Magistrate was correct in determining 
that any ineffectiveness by defense counsel was cured by the multiple warnings from the State 
5 Keserovic cites to and
1
argues based upon 1932 U.S. Supreme Court language as well as a 2001 
California Supreme Court Case. A quick review of his Table of Cases reflects no case newer 
than 2012 in this ever-evolving area. 
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and the notice and inquiry provided by the Court. Thus the Magistrate's dismissal should have 
been upheld and the District Court's decision should be reversed. 
vt:... 
DATED this day of October, 2014. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: ~.J.~ 
Shawna Dunn 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
ctL By: 
Jamoo K. Dickinson 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'-IA 
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copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to the following person by the following 
method: 
Kimberly Simmons 
Deputy Public Defender 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front Street, Room 1107 
Boise, ID 83702 
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